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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit in a sample of 890 firms in six emerging 
economies. We find that although provision of trade credit increases right after the crisis, it consequently 
collapses in the following months and years. We observe that firms with weaker financial position (for 
example, high pre-crisis level of short-term debt and low cash stocks and cash flows) are more likely to 
reduce trade credit provided to their customers. This suggests that the decline in aggregate credit provision 
is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit, which follows the bank credit crunch. Our results 
are consistent with the “redistribution view” of trade credit provision, in which bank credit is redistributed 
via trade credit by the firms with stronger financial position to the firms with weaker financial stand.   
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 The financial crises experienced by emerging markets during the nineties present 
extreme cases of collapse of institutional financing and, consequently, can be useful in 
studying the role of alternative sources of financing during periods of severe monetary 
contraction. Previous evidence suggests that trade credit could play an important role by 
compensating for unavailable bank credit.  Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that firms with 
weaker banking relations use more trade credit;  Nilsen (2002) shows that small firms and 
large firms without bond ratings increase reliance on trade credit during monetary 
contractions;  Fisman and Love (2003) argue that in countries with undeveloped financial 
intermediaries trade credit provides an alternative source of funds, which allows higher 
growth rates in industries that can be characterized as intense trade credit users.  Wilner 
(2000) claims that suppliers tend to assist customers in distress to maintain long-term 
commercial relationships. This paper contributes to the previous literature by studying the 
ability of trade credit to provide an alternative source of financing during financial 
crises.1 
We study the effects of the 1997 Asian Crisis on firms operating in Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, and the impact of the 1994 Peso 
devaluation on Mexican firms. We create a panel of about 890 large, publicly traded 
firms, and analyze their trade credit behavior around the crisis time. We are most 
interested in examining whether trade credit can compensate for contracted bank credit 
during the credit crunch that characterizes financial crises. 
We find that trade credit provided and received by the firms in our sample 
increases immediately after the crisis. More surprisingly, we find that the trade credit 
                                                          
1 Papers by Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000a, b and 2001), Chang and Velasco 
(1999), Ding, Domac and Ferri (1998), Ding and Domac (1998),  Calomiris and Beim (2001) and Bris at al. 
(2002) among others study  financial crisis.  
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provided by our firms (as opposed to what they receive) collapses in the aftermath of the 
crisis and continues to contract for several years. Because we measure trade credit 
provided as a ratio of accounts receivable to sales, the decline in credit provision is not 
simply driven by decline in sales. In other words, we find that credit provided by our 
firms declines more than their sales, in percentage terms. 
As in any study of credit provision, the interpretation of our results is inherently 
difficult because of the familiar “identification problem”. The prolonged decline in trade 
credit provided by the firms in the aftermath of the crisis could be due to the 
unwillingness of customers to take on more credit (a demand effect), or to the inability of 
the suppliers of goods to provide such a credit (a supply effect). Thus, a declining pattern 
of trade credit provision does not automatically mean that trade credit cannot play an 
important role in compensating for contracted bank credit.2  
To understand what is driving the equilibrium patterns of trade credit, we study 
firms’ heterogeneous responses to the crisis events.  More specifically, we analyze trade 
credit policy as a function of firms’ relative financial health.  If the reduction of trade 
credit provision is significantly higher for firms that have weaker financial conditions, it 
would imply that the contraction of such credit is most likely driven by a supply effect.  
Using several crisis-specific indicators of firms’ relative financial strength, we find that 
this is indeed the case. 
The main financial indicator we use is reliance on short-term debt.  Firms with 
high share of short-term debt are likely to be the most disadvantaged by the crises, due to 
increased interest rates and difficulties in rolling over their debts.  We observe that before 
                                                          
2 In other words, if the trade credit provided in equilibrium falls after the crises because customers demand 
less trade credit, then this pattern does not say anything about the ability of trade credit to compensate for 
contracted bank credit. If, on the other hand, trade credit provision falls because firms reduce their credit 
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crises, when short-term debt is abundant and (relatively) cheap, firms with higher 
percentage of short-term debt provide more credit to their customers and rely less on 
credit from suppliers. However, after the crisis, these firms face a disadvantaged financial 
position, and consequently they significantly cut the credit extended to their customers, 
and use more credit from suppliers.  That is, firms with higher reliance on short-term debt 
are the main suppliers of trade credit during non-crisis periods, but they reduce trade 
credit provision relatively more as a response to the aggregate collapse of bank credit.  
We also use two indicators of  liquidity (using cash stocks and cash flow) as an 
alternative measure of firm’s financial health.  We find that firms with relatively lower 
liquidity also show a larger decrease in their trade credit provision after crises. We avoid 
endogeneity problem by using pre-crisis measures of financial health to study the post-
crisis trade credit policy.  
While it is likely that some firms benefit from the crisis, on average most firms 
are hurt by it.  The result that firms with relatively weaker financial stand are more likely 
to reduce trade credit provision, coupled with the prevalent deterioration in firms’ 
financial conditions around crises, suggests that the prolonged contraction in aggregate 
trade credit could be, to a large extent, attributed to the supply effect.   
The identification of the temporary increase of trade credit at the peak of financial 
crisis is, however, different.  Given the collapse of alternative sources of financing 
(which suddenly dry out or become very expensive), it is natural to expect an increase in 
trade credit demand in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, as firms move down in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
supply without regarding for a similar or even increased demand, this pattern of trade credit would indeed 
imply that this instrument has only limited potential to compensate for bank credit.  
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pecking order.3  What we do not know is whether suppliers willingly allow customers to 
take longer to repay (i.e. increasing supply to meet a higher demand) or they simply 
cannot avoid payments delays by their customers (i.e. unintended increase in supply).  
While we cannot decisively disentangle intended from unintended credit, our study 
makes it apparent that trade credit can provide a very short-term source of “emergency 
capital” due to the flexibility in credit terms, which allow for temporary extension of 
credit maturity. In line with this argument, Cuñat (2002) argues that this assistance in 
case of temporary illiquidity is one of the reasons why trade credit is so expensive. 
In sum, our findings suggest that while trade credit could serve as a source of  
very short-term “emergency credit”, it could not fully substitute for contracted bank 
credit in the longer aftermath of the crisis.  We use the finding that firms with weaker 
financial position are showing the highest decline in the provision of credit to their 
customers to argue that the prolonged decline in trade credit provision we observe during 
post crisis periods is most likely driven by a supply effect. .  
Our results are broadly consistent with the redistribution view of trade credit.  
This view posits that firms with better access to capital will redistribute the credit they 
receive to less advantaged firms via trade credit. This view was first proposed by Meltzer 
(1960) and further supported by Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Nilsen (2002) among 
others.  We note that for actual “redistribution” to take place some firms need to be able 
to raise external finance, which they would pass on to less privileged firms.4  However, 
during a financial crisis, alternative sources of finance are likely to dry out – stock 
                                                          
3 Petersen and Rajan (1997)´s results imply that trade credit comes lower on the pecking order, suggesting 
that “borrowing from trade creditors, at least for longer periods of time, is a more expensive form of 
credit”.  
4 For example, during monetary contractions in the US large firms increase the issuance of commercial 
paper (Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995)) and accelerate bank credit growth while small firms 
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markets crash and foreign lenders and investors pull out their money.  As all potential 
sources of funds collapse there may be “nothing to redistribute” in terms of trade credit; 
thus, contraction in the supply of formally intermediated funds lead to contraction in the 
supply of trade credit finance.  Consistent with this argument, we also find that countries 
that experience a sharper decline in bank credit also experience a sharper decline in trade 
credit.5  
  The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section II describes the data and 
presents basic descriptive statistics and graphical analysis.  In section III we discuss our 
empirical strategy.  In section IV we present the results and in Section V we conclude. 
 
II. Data 
II.1. Sample  
We study two of the four major crises that occurred during the nineties, i.e. the 
Mexican devaluation in late 1994-early 1995, and the South East Asia currency crisis in 
mid-1997 including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.6 We use the 
Worldscope database, which contains data on publicly traded firms around the world and 
represents about 95% of the world’s market value. Since it focuses mostly on the firms 
for which there is a significant interest of international investors, the sample represents 
the largest firms in each country. Our study excludes all financial firms. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reduce it (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Such access to alternative sources of finance in the US is likely to 
be behind the aggregate increase in trade credit (during monetary contractions) observed by Nilsen (2002). 
5 Our results are also consistent with patterns observed in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001). They 
find that the provision of trade credit across countries is positively correlated with the level of development 
of financial intermediaries. 
6 We are not able to include the analysis of the Russian default occurred in 1998 and the Brazilian 
devaluation in early 1999 due to lack of data. We chose not to include information on China and Taiwan 
because, even though they also suffered contemporaneous financial crisis, their impact is thought to be less 
spread and not as pronounced.  
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The periods of financial crises are usually characterized by high rate of 
liquidations and consolidations, which creates an unbalanced sample of firms 
(Worldscope immediately delists all firms that go through any type of reorganization). 
We present our results using this unbalanced sample to avoid an attrition bias, however, 
all our results still hold when estimated on two alternative balanced samples.7  Table 1 
Panel A reports the number of firms per country (counted at the crisis year) showing a 
total sample of 890 firms. 
 
II.2. Crisis timing 
Table 1 Panel A reports the time of each crisis considered in our sample. To trace 
out the timing before and after the crisis we create the timeline variable, which equals to 
zero for the crisis year and takes values –1, –2, –3 and 1, 2, 3 for the subsequent pre- and 
post-crisis years respectively. The crisis year is defined for each firm at the fiscal year 
ending within the 12-month interval after the crisis hit. Thus, for example, for the Asian 
countries that were hit by the crisis in July 1997, the crisis year is defined as 1997 for 
those firms which fiscal year ends from August to December 1997, and as 1998 for those 
closing between January and July 1998.  
 
II. 3. Dependent Variables 
Our main variables of interest are accounts payables and accounts receivables, 
which show the amount of trade credit that firms obtain from suppliers and provide to 
customers, respectively. We scale these trade credit variables using sales (for receivables) 
                                                          
7 The first sample, called “balanced 5”, contains all firms that are present in the Worldscope database for at 
least 2 years before and after the crisis (therefore covering 5 years around the crisis time); and the second 
sample, “balanced 7”, contains firms that are in the dataset for at least 7 years around the crisis time. 
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and cost of goods sold (for payables).8 These ratios capture the importance of trade credit 
in the financing of the economic activity. One advantage of using ratios scaled by flow 
variables is that these measures control for decline in economic activity (i.e. sales) that 
are commonly associated with crises. Thus, whenever we find a declining ratio of 
accounts receivables to sales, we know that accounts receivables have declined more than 
sales, in percent terms.  
There are two ways these ratios could be interpreted. If trade credit were extended 
for the whole year, the ratio of receivables to sales would show what percent of sales is 
done on credit. However, as trade credit usually has much shorter maturity, the 
alternative interpretation of such a ratio is the number of days the customers take to repay 
the credit (assuming all customers receive 100% of credit).9 In reality, the ratios are likely 
to capture both, the percent of the goods sold on credit and the time it takes before the 
credit is repaid. We follow tradition and multiply these ratios by 360 and interpret them 
in terms of the number of days credit is extended and received (keeping the above caveat 
in mind).  
We also study net credit as the difference between receivables and payables, 
again, scaled by sales. Firms that obtain more credit from suppliers are likely to be more 
willing to extend credit to their customers. In this sense, net credit shows the relative 
willingness to extend trade credit, net of the credit firms receive themselves. 
Thus, we use the following set of three dependent variables: 
TRECTOS: Trade Receivables / Total Sales 
                                                          
8 It would be best to scale payables by the cost of materials purchased rather than total cost of the goods 
sold, which includes labor costs, but such data is not available in our dataset (neither it is in most other 
datasets used in previous papers). As a second best approach (also used in other studies) we scale payables 
by the total cost. 
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TPAYTOC: Trade Payables / Cost of Goods Sold 
NTCS: (Trade Receivables – Trade Payables)/ Total Sales 
 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we examined the distribution of our key 
variables and removed outliers. We removed all figures that appeared to be misreported 
(such as negative numbers for trade credit or assets). For our trade credit ratios we 
eliminated all values that implied trade credit of over one year long (this eliminated about 
2-3% in the top tail of the distribution). 
 
II.4. Descriptive analysis 
Figure 1 presents the medians of trade credit ratios and the aggregate bank credit 
figures around the crisis time. We observe that all trade credit ratios exhibit very similar 
patterns – a slight increase in the crisis year and sharp declines in post crisis times.  The 
decline is most pronounced for net trade credit (from the highest to the lowest point the 
drop is about 36%) and is much less dramatic for payables (with a change of only about 
15%). We also see that trade payables start to go up in the second year after the crisis and 
almost fully recover in the third year; receivables, on the other hand, stay low for all 3 
years after the crisis.10 Interestingly, we observe that bank credit growth declines in the 
two consecutive years after the crisis hit, clearly resembling the behavior of trade credit. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 In the US, for example, the most often term for extension of trade credit is about 30 days, and it varies by 
industry, from about 10 days to 60 days (see Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) and Mian and Smith (1992)). 
Rarely, if ever, trade credit is extended for over 6 months.  
10 We also plot ratios scaled by assets, for comparison. We referred to them as trectoa, tpaytoa and ntca for 
receivables, payables and net trade credit respectively. When the graphs are done separately for each 
country, we find that most countries follow the same aggregate patterns. The most uniform behavior is 
observed for receivables and net credit, while payables seem to exhibit more variation across countries. 
Reproducing these graphs for mean ratios generates identical patterns.  
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Table 1, Panel C presents tests for statistical significance of the differences in 
trade credit figures between crisis and post-crisis periods relative to the pre-crisis time.  
The outcome is very consistent with our graphical analysis: both payables and receivables 
show a significant increase in the crisis year, but only trade receivables and net credit 
show a persistent decline in subsequent periods relative to the pre-crisis one. In the next 
section we present the empirical models we use to study these patterns more formally.   
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
To study the effects of the crisis and the post-crisis on trade credit, we employ a 
standard panel-data approach utilizing a firm fixed effects model. The fixed effects 
capture the unobserved heterogeneity in the firm-specific (i.e. time-invariant) levels of 
trade credit and allow us to isolate the effects of crisis and post-crisis relative to the pre-
crisis behavior.  
 
III.1. Aggregate behavior 
Our first test studies the aggregate behavior of firms during and after crises. To 
implement it we define dummy variables for the crisis and post-crisis years, labeled as 
CRISIS and POST, respectively. Combined with the fixed effects, these two dummies 
capture the changes in trade credit relative to several years of pre-crisis data.  
We use the following model:  
ititctctit XPOSTCRISISTC εβββα ++++= 321i **     (1) 
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Where TC is one of the three trade credit measures described in the data section, 
X is a vector of firm and country time-specific control variables, α is a firm fixed effect 
and ε is an error term.  
The CRISIS and POST-crisis dummies show the difference of trade credit ratios 
in the crisis and post-crisis years relative to the average of pre-crisis years. In the reported 
regressions we use two dummies:  POST12 and POST3, which equal one for the first two 
years and the third year following the crisis, respectively.11  
We estimate the model using a technique that allows for extra care in treating the 
error term. In particular, to make sure our results are robust to any possible temporal 
correlation among the firms in each country-year period, we define a “clustering” 
variable as a combination of country and time. Introducing a “cluster” option in our 
methodology allows for an unspecified correlation structure of errors within the 
“clusters”. This is important since during the crisis and post-crisis years, the errors (i.e. 
unexplained variation) could be correlated for the firms within the country. However, the 
correlation might be different for pre-crisis, crisis or post-crisis years.  
Causal factors that are either time-invariant (for example industry) or slowly 
changing (for example size) would be mostly captured by the fixed effects. To control for 
factors that vary significantly over time we use several control variables (included in the 
vector X in model 1) that have been suggested by the trade credit literature.12  We use the 
ratio of cash flow to total assets, the ratio of cash balances to total assets (measured at the 
beginning of the period), and the firm-level sales growth rate in the previous year. 
                                                          
11 We also run all regressions with a separate set of dummies (i.e. POST1, POST2 and POST3), all results 
remain consistent and are available on request. 
12  See Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) for discussion of the 
variable choice.  
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Finally, we control for the depreciation of the exchange rate to capture the country-time 
differences in the magnitude of the crisis and recovery.  
We removed observations with extreme values of sales growth, cash and cash 
flows ratios (outside of the 1% tails in the distribution).13 Summary statistics for these 
variables are reported in Table 1, Panel B.  
 
III.2. Heterogeneous firm responses 
To understand what is driving the aggregate results, we analyze firms’ 
heterogeneous responses to crisis events as a function of their relative financial positions. 
We use several indicators of the firm’s financial strength.  
First, we use a ratio of short-term debt to assets. Firms with a high proportion of 
short-term debt are likely to be the most disadvantaged by the crisis because they need to 
roll-over their debt when it is either impossible or extremely costly.  While high share of 
short-term debt is not necessarily an indication of strong financial position before the 
crisis, it is clearly an indication of weak financial position right after it.   
Second, we use more “standard” proxies for liquidity position of the firm: firm’s 
cash flow and cash stock (both relative to firm’s assets). We conjecture that firms with 
larger pre-crisis stock of cash holdings (i.e. liquidity) as well as those with larger cash 
flow generation can fall back on this cushion during the crisis times, and are therefore 
likely to be in a better financial position to provide trade credit to their customers (as well 
as to avoid making use of expensive financing from their suppliers). 
To study differences in firm’s responses to crisis, we interact our financing 
variables with crisis and post crisis dummies. One may worry about the endogeneity of 
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contemporaneous financing variables, such as short-term debt and liquidity measures, 
given that they are likely to be affected by the firm’s trade credit policy.  To address this 
potential concern, we use pre-crisis levels of our financing variables in the interaction 
terms. Thus, we study responses to crisis in firms with different pre-crisis financial 
health.   
We use the following extension of the model in equation (1): 
ititcticti
ctcti
XPOSTFINCRISISFIN
POSTCRISISTC
εββ
ββα
++++
+++=
−− **
**
)1(4)1(3
21    (2) 
where FINi(-1)  represents one of the above described indicators of financial position. 
Since FIN is not time-varying (because it is measured at the pre-crisis level), the level of 
FIN is subsumed into the fixed effects.  
 In this model, the effect of crisis on TC depends on the level of financial 
indicator, FIN. For firms with FIN equal to zero, the difference in trade credit ratios 
during crisis and post-crisis years (relative to pre-crisis average) will be given by β1 and 
β2, respectively; same as in model (1). However, the effect of crisis on TC will vary for 
firms with different levels of FIN: e.g. for firms with a financial indicator equal to F, the 
difference in trade credit levels during the crisis (relative to pre-crisis) will be given by β1 
+ β3 * F.  
 
III.3. Heterogeneous country-level response to crisis 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 To preserve our sample size we do not drop outlier observations but simply set them to missing, As a 
result the number of actual observations used is somewhat different from model to model. 
 13
Our final test explores the variation in bank credit growth across years and countries in 
our sample.14 To test the effect of bank credit growth on trade credit behavior before, 
during and after the crisis, we use the following model: 
 
ititctctctct
ctctctit
XPOSTCREDITGRCRISISCREDITGR
CREDITGRPOSTCRISISTC
εββ
βββα
++++
+++=
**
*
54
321i             (3) 
 
Where CREDITGR is the country-year growth rate in the private credit to GDP 
ratio (obtained from the IFS). The coefficients β3, β4 and β5 show the reaction of trade 
credit to bank credit growth during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis respectively. As 
before, we allow for the same set of control variables for robustness checks. Finding 
positive coefficients on β3, β4 and β5 would suggest that increase in bank credit leads to 
more trade credit provided and/or received by firms in our sample, consistent with the 
redistribution story.  
 
IV. Results  
IV.1. Aggregate patterns 
We present our main results using the unbalanced sample.15  All tables show the 
first three regressions without control variables and the following three including the set 
of time varying control variables.  
Table 2 presents our basic results. The coefficients on the crisis and post-crisis 
dummies show the difference in trade credit during these stages relative to the pre-crisis 
                                                          
14 Since we only have 6 countries and at most 7 years, we are concerned about the degrees of freedom. 
Therefore these results should be interpreted with caution. 
15 Results for the “balanced 5” and “balanced 7” samples are very similar and are available on request. 
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period. We observe the same pattern shown in the graphical analysis. In particular, 
accounts receivables increase immediately after the crisis and then drop sharply in the 
post-crisis time. Account payables, however, after increasing at the peak of the crises, do 
not exhibit a significant decline (relative to pre-crisis figures). In terms of the magnitude, 
we observe that during the crisis year both payables and receivables increase by about a 
week, relative to the pre-crisis period. In the post-crisis, however, the receivables drop by 
the same amount in the first two years (again, relative to pre-crisis figures) and continue 
dropping well into the third year.16  
As discussed earlier, there could be several alternative explanations for these 
patterns. On the one hand, the decline in trade credit provided could be the result of a 
supply effect: the firms that suffer from lack of access to intermediated credit reduce the 
supply of credit they are willing to provide to their customers. On the other hand, this 
pattern would be also consistent with a demand-side story: the customers of our firms 
become less willing to take on more credit. To understand these aggregate patterns, 
below we explore the firms’ heterogeneous responses to crisis.  
We focus on deciphering the reasons for the aggregate decline in trade credit 
provided by our firms in the post-crisis years as this result is both more surprising and 
more prolonged (as it continues for several years after the crisis) than the short-term 
increase in trade credit provided during the crisis year. In addition our data are not well-
suited to study the reasons for temporary increase in trade credit (for example, we do not 
                                                          
16 Because the trade credit maturity is usually much shorter than one year, the temporary spike in both 
ratios is not simply caused by a mechanical relationship due to contraction in the scaling factor (i.e. sales or 
cost of goods sold). Suppose the crisis occurred several months before the end of the fiscal year and the 
maturity of receivables is less than one year. Then, the mechanical relationship would actually run in 
reverse – if accounts receivable decline as much as sales do, the ratio of receivables to sales would go down 
because the numerator will reflect a post-crisis low level of receivables (extended on post-crisis low level 
of sales), while the denominator would reflect the whole year of sales (i.e. high pre-crisis level and low 
post-crisis level).   
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have the data on non-performing loans, or the data on reclassified receivables), while we 
do have enough data to shed some light on the reasons for decline in trade credit after the 
crisis.  
 
IV.2. Heterogeneous firm responses 
 In this section, we study firms´ trade credit policy as a function of their relative financial 
health.  The supply-driven reason for decline in trade credit provision after the crisis 
would be caused by the unwillingness (or inability) of suppliers to provide credit to their 
customers. In this case, we would expect that those firms in more difficult financial 
position would be the most likely to cut the supply of credit to their customers. The 
supply-driven reason for reduction in trade credit provided to firms’ customers would 
imply that such a reduction is relatively higher for firms with weaker pre-crisis financial 
conditions. This argument forms our main identification strategy.  
IV.2.1. Short-term debt.  
As suggested earlier, firms that enter the crisis with a high proportion of short-
term debt are likely to be particularly disadvantaged by the credit crunch, because of the 
higher costs of short-term debt and difficulties in rolling it over. Even though the 
contemporaneous short-term debt to assets ratio is likely to be endogenous, we initially 
run the regressions using this figure, because it allows us to observe the effect of short-
term debt in the pre-crisis period. We estimate model (2) and present results in Table 3, 
Panel A.  
The coefficient on Stdtoa shows the effect of short-term debt on firms´ pre-crisis 
trade credit provision: We find that firms with higher percent of short-term debt provide 
more credit to their customers during non-crisis times. To get a sense on the order of  
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magnitude in which the reliance of short-term debt affects trade credit policy, we focus 
on the results presented in Column 4 (which includes controls for time-invariant firm 
characteristics). The coefficients imply that firms with a ratio of short-term debt to assets 
equal to one17 extend credit for about 50 more days relative to firms with zero short-term 
debt. Alternatively, an increase in short-term debt to assets by one standard deviation 
(0.18, as reported in Table 1, Panel B), would imply an increase in trade credit provided 
of about 9 days, which is an economically significant effect.  
The CRISIS coefficient shows the effect of crisis on firms with zero short-term 
debt: these firms increase trade credit provided by about 11 days during the crisis, 
relative to the pre-crisis period. The coefficient on the interaction of Stdtoa and CRISIS  
shows how the response to crises changes as firms increase reliance on short-term debt. 
We find that firms with the maximum ratio of short-term debt to assets actually shorten 
the credit provided by about 16 days, relatively to pre-crisis levels (calculated as 11.32-
27.81).   
Finally, the post-crisis dummies (POST12 and POST3) show the difference in the 
post-crisis trade credit provision relative to pre-crisis for firms with zero short-term debt. 
Interestingly, these dummies are not significant, which suggests that firms with zero 
short-term debt do not experience a decline in trade credit provided in the aftermath of 
the crisis (relative to pre-crisis period). Thus, the decline in the aggregate trade credit 
observed in the post-crisis could be mostly attributed to firms with some short-term debt.  
Looking at the interaction of Stdtoa and post-crisis dummies we analyze the 
differential effect of post-crisis on firms with different levels of short-term debt. The 
results imply that firms with a maximum amount of short-term debt cut the credit 
                                                          
17 We use this extreme ratio of Stdtoa for illustration only. In our sample the maximum value for Stdtoa is 
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provided to their customers by about 50 days in the first two years after the crisis relative 
to what these firms provided in the pre-crisis period.18 Hence, firms without short-term 
debt do not experience a significant decline in the credit provided to their customers in 
the post-crisis, while firms with more short-term debt experience a significant decline.   
The above discussion focused on the effects of crisis and post-crisis on firms with 
different levels of short-term debt. An alternative interpretation could focus on the effects 
of short-term debt in different time periods. Thus, we see that while at the pre-crisis firms 
with a maximum amount of short-term debt extend credit for 50 more days (relative to 
firms with zero short-term debt), during the crisis these firms extend credit for only 21 
more days (i.e. 48.99-27.81); finally, after the crisis, the trade credit policy of these firms 
is no longer different from that of firms with zero short-term debt (i.e. 48.99 – 50.68). In 
other words, all the extra credit that firms with a maximum amount of short-term debt 
provided at the pre-crisis (relative to firms with zero short-term debt) is eliminated in the 
post-crisis.  
In addition  to the effect of short-term debt on receivables, we see that firms with 
more short-term debt experience an increase in payables during and after the crisis. These 
results are consistent with the idea that firms with high short-term debt have a preferable 
financial position before the crisis (and therefore provide more credit to their customers) 
and a disadvantaged financial position after the crisis hit (which leads them to provide 
less credit to their customers and rely more on credit from suppliers).  
As we already suggested, potential endogeneity could arise because short-term 
debt could be influenced by the trade credit policy. To control for such potential 
                                                                                                                                                                             
equal to 0.99.   
18 We calculate this effect by taking the coefficient on Post12*Stdtoa interaction, which is equal to –50.68 
and assuming that Post12 dummy is equal to zero, since it is not significant.   
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endogeneity, we re-estimate our model using only pre-crisis values of short-term debt in 
interactions. The results are reported in Table 3, Panel B. There, the pre-crisis level of 
short-term debt is subsumed in fixed effects (because it is no longer time-varying) and we 
are only able to see the differential responses to the crisis events. We find the same 
response: firms with high pre-crisis level of short-term debt decrease trade credit 
provision during and after crises and increase reliance on credit from suppliers. 
These results suggest that firms with high pre-crisis level of short-term debt are in 
a more difficult financial position after the crisis and, therefore, the decrease in trade 
credit they provided to their customers is driven by their unwillingness (or inability) to 
extend (i.e. supply) more credit. It is quite unlikely that the decrease in customer’s 
demand for trade credit after the crisis would be related to the firm’s financial position 
before the crisis. This allows us to rule out the demand-driven explanation for the decline 
in aggregate trade credit in favor of the supply-driven story. In other words, the 
disruption to the redistribution mechanism typically provided by trade credit comes from 
the special difficulties inflicted upon the most traditional suppliers of this type of credit, 
namely, the firms with higher exposures to short-term borrowing.   
 
IV.2.2. Cash flows and liquidity 
To test the robustness of our previous result, we use two other indicators of firms´ 
financial health. Firms that arrive at the crises with a large liquidity cushion (represented 
either by larger cash stocks or cash flow generation) are better fitted to financially 
support profitable commercial operations (by extending more credit to their customers) as 
well as to temporarily reduce reliance on credit from suppliers.  
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In Table 4 we estimate model (2), using the pre-crisis cash flow to net assets ratio 
as an alternative indicator of firms´ financial position. The interaction terms are positive 
and highly significant for receivables, with or without the subset of additional control 
variables. Thus, firms with high pre-crisis cash flow generation provide more financing to 
their customers both during and after crises. More specifically, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients imply that firms with cash flow ratios below the 86 percentile (about .13 in 
the data) reduce the credit provided to their customers after the crisis, while firms with 
cash flows ratios above the 86 percentile actually increase the credit they provide in the 
post-crisis. There is no evidence that firms with high cash flow make less use of trade 
credit during and after crises.  
The next test includes the interaction of the crisis and post-crisis indicators with 
the pre-crisis cash to assets ratio. Results are presented in Table 5. There we observe that 
firms with higher pre-crisis cash to assets ratios tend to give more credit to their 
customers during crisis and post-crisis times. Finally, we also find that firms with larger 
stocks of cash rely less on credit from suppliers; this is only true, however, for the two 
years following the crisis hit.  
Since we construct the interactions using pre-crisis cash flows and cash stocks, 
the results imply that firms that come to the crisis with a strong financial position are less 
affected by the crisis and consequently provide more credit to their customers, relative to 
firms that arrived at the crises with a weaker financial position. These two sets of results 
reinforce our conclusion above that the decline of trade credit observed after crises is 
mainly driven by a supply effect.  
 
IV.3. Heterogeneous country-level response to crisis: Bank Credit Growth 
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To deepen our understanding of trade credit patterns during crisis and post-crisis 
times, we study the differences in response of trade credit to aggregate bank credit 
behavior. A further confirmation of the supply side story would suggest that countries 
that experience a sharper decline in bank credit should also experience a sharper decline 
in trade credit. In other words, the supply of intermediated credit would affect the supply 
of trade credit. 
We use the model (3) and report the results in Table 6.19 First, we observe a clear 
positive relationship between bank credit growth and extension of trade credit during the 
crisis period. Again, the positive response is the most significant for receivables, and not 
so much for payables, where coefficients are positive but non-significant. We also find 
that the post-crisis drop in trade credit provided by the firms in our sample (and therefore 
the drop in the net credit) is sharper for countries that experienced larger contractions in 
bank credit. Despite the potential limitations of this analysis, the results are consistent 
with the supply-driven explanation: Contractions in bank credit are at least partially 
responsible for contractions in trade credit. Since most of the contraction in bank credit is 
likely to come in the form of short-term debt not being rolled over (since long-term debt 
would not be immediately affected by the crisis), this result bodes well with our earlier 
results for firms with higher shares of short-term debt.  These results are also consistent 
with Demirguc- Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) and Meltzer (1960). 
 
V. Conclusions  
We study the behavior of trade credit around the time of financial crises. The 
simple inspection of trade credit patterns shows a significant increase of trade credit at 
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the peak of financial crises, followed by a subsequent collapse of this source of financing 
right after the crisis events.  This is also confirmed in a more thorough regression 
analysis. 
Given that these findings could be explained by either supply- or demand-side 
stories, we study firms´ heterogeneous responses to crises, and characterize changes of 
trade credit policy around crises as a function of firms´ relative financial health.  
Specifically, we analyze two alternative indicators of firms’ financial strength: reliance 
on short-term debt and liquidity.   
We find that before the crises, firms with high proportion of short-term debt are 
significant providers of trade credit. However, after the crisis, these firms sharply cut the 
amount of credit they provide and increase reliance on credit from suppliers. In other 
words, what is a preferred financial position before the crisis (i.e. short-term debt) turns 
into a heavy disadvantage right after it, with the corresponding change in trade credit 
policy. We also find some evidence that more liquid firms (i.e. those with high cash stock 
or cash flow) extend more credit to their customers and rely less on credit from their 
suppliers. 
Given that the reduction of trade credit provision is significantly higher for firms 
exhibiting weaker financial conditions, we conclude that the contraction of such a credit 
is most likely driven by a supply effect. Our findings show that even though trade credit 
could potentially serve a role of emergency assistance, this assistance is very short-term. 
In the long aftermath of the crisis, trade credit contracts as a result of overall shortage of 
funds and difficulties experienced by firms with high reliance on short-term debt. Our 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 We use the country and time variation in the credit growth. However, since we only have 6 countries and 
7 periods the degrees of freedom might be a concern. Therefore these results should be interpreted with a 
caution and would require more scrutiny in the subsequent research.  
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results highlight the importance of the aggregate bank credit availability, especially 
during the times of the crisis. 
Although a useful start, our paper leaves many areas for future research. Our data 
includes only few crises in a small set of countries and consequently, leaves us with some 
concern regarding degrees-of-freedom. In addition, the patterns observed for largest 
publicly traded firms may not generalize to the rest of the firms’ population. More 
research is needed to test whether the patterns we find hold for different firms’ sizes and 
are robust in a different sample of crisis episodes. Finally, our paper does not answer the 
question of whether trade credit helps the firms to survive the crisis, or increase market 
share and profitability. These are important questions to warrant more future research on 
this topic with better-suited data.  
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Table 1 Panel A: Number of Observations by Country 
 
This table presents the number of observations by country, based on the number of non-missing 
values of the variable Trectos (computed as trade receivables / net sales ), counted at the crisis 
time.  The second column presents the Crisis Date for each country. 
 
 
Number of Crisis Country 
Observations Date 
Indonesia 102 Jul-97 
Korea 236 Oct-97 
Malaysia 261 Jul-97 
Mexico 59 Dec-94 
Philippines 54 Jul-97 
Thailand 178 Jul-97 
Total 890   
 
 
 
Table 1 Panel B: Summary Statistics 
 
Trectos is measured as trade receivables / net sales, Tpaytoc is trade payables / cost of goods 
sold, and Ntcs is net trade credit (i.e. receivables minus payables) / net sales. Cfw is operating 
cash flow to assets, Growth is computed as lagged growth of sales, Cashta is cash/assets, 
Exchrgr is the country’s devaluation of the currency in the last year, and Stdtoa is short term 
debt/total assets.  The sample is the unbalanced panel of firms three years before and after each 
crisis. 
 
 
Variable N. Obs. Mean Min Median Max St. Dev. 
Dependent Variables       
Trectos 5552 94.03 0.00 80.86 290.67 60.68
Tpaytoc 5554 57.54 0.00 49.59 210.00 38.97
Ntcs 5325 51.42 -114.15 41.43 275.75 56.88
Control Variables       
Cfw 5651 0.05 -0.58 0.06 0.31 0.11
Growth 5255 0.05 -0.90 0.05 0.90 0.26
Cashta 5868 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.11
Exchrgr 5441 0.10 -0.24 0.03 1.24 0.23
Stdtoa 5755 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.99 0.18
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Table 1 Panel C: ANOVA Analysis 
 
This table reports the difference in means between the two periods and the corresponding p-
values (computed using the Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels). Trectos is computed as 
trade receivables / net sales, Tpaytoc is trade payables / cost of goods sold, and Ntcs is net trade 
credit / net sales.  The sample is the unbalanced panel of firms three years before and after each 
crisis. 
 
 
Variable Crisis vs. Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis-vs. Pre-Crisis 
   
Trectos 5.2930 -13.2226 
 0.080 0.000 
   
Tpaytoc 6.9031 0.5190 
 0.000 1.000 
   
Ntcs 0.0496 -14.93 
  1.000 0.000 
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Table 2: Trade Credit in Aggregate 
 
The dependent variables are the trade credit measures: Trectos is trade receivables / net sales, 
Tpaytoc is trade payables / cost of goods sold, and Ntcs is net trade credit (i.e. receivables minus 
payables) / net sales. Crisis is a dummy for crisis year, Post12 is a dummy for first two years 
after the crisis and Post3 is dummy for third year after the crisis. Cfw is operating cash flow to 
assets, Growth is lagged growth of sales, Cashta is cash/assets measured at the beginning of the 
year,  Exchrgr is the rate of currency devaluation. The models are estimated with firm-fixed 
effects (see model (1) in the paper) using the unbalanced sample. The standard errors were 
obtained using clustering on country and time as explained in the paper.  ***, ** and * represent 
coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Absolute value of t-stats in brackets. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis 7.58** 7.02** 2.07 6.85** 7.21** 1.64 
 [2.04] [2.12] [0.82] [2.03] [2.11] [0.63] 
Post12 -6.29** 0.31 -7.56*** -7.57** -0.31 -8.33*** 
 [2.02] [0.22] [2.63] [2.28] [0.19] [2.88] 
Post3 -13.94*** 1.21 -15.04*** -14.16*** 1.15 -14.63*** 
 [3.19] [0.26] [4.82] [3.73] [0.28] [5.09] 
Cfw    2.89 -9.26* 18.12** 
    [0.28] [1.66] [2.09] 
Growth    -4.69 -6.48*** 0.08 
    [1.40] [3.11] [0.03] 
Cashta    4.41 3.31 4.38 
    [0.49] [0.37] [0.33] 
Exchrgr    7.82 -5.13 11.02*** 
    [1.58] [1.23] [3.07] 
Observations 5552 5554 5325 4256 4244 4091 
R-squared 0.74 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.76 
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Table 3: Trade Credit and Short-Term Debt 
 
The dependent variables are the trade credit measures. See header to Table 2 for variable 
definitions. The Stdtoa is the ratio of short-term debt to assets measured at the individual firm 
level.  This table shows the interactions of Stdtoa with the Crisis, Post12 and Post3 dummies.  
The models are estimated with firm-fixed effects (see model (2) in the paper), using the 
unbalanced sample. The standard errors were obtained using clustering on country and time as 
explained in the paper.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.  Absolute value of robust t-stats in brackets.   
 
Panel A: Contemporaneous levels of short-term debt.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis 9.56** 5.02 4.31 11.32*** 3.95 9.02*** 
 [2.24] [1.22] [1.31] [3.08] [0.94] [3.12] 
Post12 3.32 -0.01 3.29 3.1 -2.59 5.16* 
 [1.04] [0.01] [1.15] [0.83] [1.19] [1.73] 
Post3 -2.4 -0.05 -2.45 -1.14 -0.93 0.99 
 [0.59] [0.01] [0.95] [0.27] [0.17] [0.36] 
Stdtoa 49.91*** 6.82 50.07*** 48.99*** -11.11 64.57*** 
 [4.63] [0.84] [5.56] [4.31] [1.31] [7.69] 
Crisis * Stdtoa -19.22** 6.14 -20.23** -27.81*** 14.55** -41.00*** 
 [2.03] [0.84] [2.20] [3.74] [2.04] [6.42] 
Post12 * Stdtoa -47.55*** 0.28 -51.36*** -50.68*** 12.03* -64.02*** 
 [4.70] [0.04] [5.34] [4.54] [1.65] [6.83] 
Post3 * Stdtoa -62.92*** 5.9 -66.21*** -66.66*** 9.27 -78.57*** 
 [5.09] [0.49] [4.68] [5.27] [0.89] [6.66] 
Cfw    -1.59 -10.37* 16.60* 
    [0.15] [1.89] [1.86] 
Growth    -4.66 -6.17*** -0.28 
    [1.29] [2.91] [0.09] 
Cashta    6.62 4.42 7.13 
    [0.80] [0.49] [0.53] 
Exchrgr    7.25 -5.25 10.05*** 
    [1.56] [1.31] [3.23] 
Observations 5455 5460 5243 4194 4187 4036 
R-squared 0.75 0.64 0.73 0.8 0.69 0.78 
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Panel B: Pre-crisis level of short-term debt.  
 
The Stdtoa1 is the firm-level ratio of short-term debt to assets computed one year before the 
crisis.   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis 11.22*** 4.34 7.67** 14.36*** 3.85 13.08*** 
 [2.81] [1.18] [2.23] [3.26] [1.01] [3.55] 
Post12 5.75 -0.64 5.93* 5.19 -3.78 7.51** 
 [1.58] [0.28] [1.90] [1.14] [1.54] [2.12] 
Post3 -0.22 6.94 -3.26 0.03 3.28 0.63 
 [0.04] [1.13] [0.81] [0.01] [0.55] [0.18] 
Crisis*Stdtoa1 -17.04* 13.67*** -27.12*** -33.90*** 15.93*** -52.58*** 
 [1.85] [2.96] [3.20] [2.82] [3.08] [5.47] 
Post12*Stdtoa1 -61.93*** 4.58 -69.33*** -61.01*** 16.46** -75.25*** 
 [5.64] [0.73] [7.05] [4.41] [2.33] [6.66] 
Post3*Stdtoa1 -72.02*** -29.20** -61.93*** -70.23*** -11.88 -74.67*** 
 [3.94] [2.20] [4.20] [3.89] [1.01] [4.86] 
Cfw    4.18 -8.17 19.45** 
    [0.40] [1.44] [2.21] 
Growth    -5.25 -6.83*** -0.54 
    [1.50] [3.18] [0.19] 
Cashta    4.38 3.02 4.03 
    [0.49] [0.33] [0.30] 
Exchrgr    7.23 -4.81 10.28*** 
    [1.40] [1.18] [3.02] 
Observations 5385 5377 5168 4183 4170 4021 
R-squared 0.75 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.77 
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Table 4: Trade Credit and Cash Flows 
 
The dependent variables are the trade credit measures. See header to Table 2 for variable 
definitions. The  Cfw1 is the measure of cash flow to total assets computed at the year prior to the 
crisis. This table shows the interactions of Cfw1 with the Crisis, Post12 and Post3 dummies.  
The models are estimated with firm-fixed effects (see model (2) in the paper) using an 
unbalanced sample. The standard errors were obtained using clustering on country and time as 
explained in the paper.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level.  Absolute value of robust t-stats in brackets.   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis 4.54 6.72** -2.37 3.95 8.66*** -4.46* 
 [1.25] [2.13] [1.04] [1.32] [2.76] [1.82] 
Post12 -16.29*** -0.27 -18.05*** -17.49*** 0.72 -19.92*** 
 [4.64] [0.15] [5.69] [5.00] [0.28] [6.48] 
Post3 -25.76*** -4.08 -24.46*** -27.73*** -3.13 -26.65*** 
 [4.84] [0.70] [8.16] [5.83] [0.59] [9.81] 
Crisis * Cfw1 50.83** 2.12 68.02*** 48.75* -21.71 84.75*** 
 [2.21] [0.11] [3.97] [1.74] [1.11] [3.19] 
Post12 * Cfw1 140.93*** 6.24 144.94*** 131.49*** -16.38 151.32*** 
 [5.84] [0.29] [6.62] [4.83] [0.67] [5.92] 
Post3 * Cfw1 159.10*** 72.03* 123.73*** 169.35*** 51.2 144.48*** 
 [4.60] [1.89] [6.19] [4.97] [1.40] [7.07] 
Growth    -4.26 -6.59*** 1.03 
    [1.23] [2.83] [0.33] 
Cashta    2.89 2.43 3.54 
    [0.31] [0.28] [0.26] 
Exchrgr    6.27 -3.45 8.65** 
    [1.10] [0.91] [2.18] 
Observations 5330 5326 5122 4291 4289 4122 
R-squared 0.75 0.63 0.72 0.78 0.68 0.76 
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Table 5: Trade Credit and Cash Stock 
 
The dependent variables are the trade credit measures. See header to Table 2 for variable 
definitions. The Cashta1 is the ratio of cash to assets computed at the pre-crisis time.  This table 
shows the interactions of Cashta1 with the Crisis, Post12 and Post3 dummies.  The models are 
estimated with firm-fixed effects (see model (2) in the paper) using an unbalanced sample. The 
standard errors were obtained using clustering on country and time as explained in the paper.  
***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Absolute value of 
robust t-stats in brackets.   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis 6.36* 7.16** 0.56 3.72 7.45** -1.79 
 [1.90] [2.27] [0.23] [1.39] [2.33] [0.75] 
Post12 -9.77*** 1.39 -11.63*** -10.45*** 2.29 -12.97*** 
 [2.64] [0.73] [3.24] [2.86] [1.40] [3.80] 
Post3 -18.71*** 1.49 -19.60*** -18.57*** 2.53 -20.47*** 
 [4.16] [0.25] [6.44] [5.00] [0.49] [7.11] 
Crisis*Cashta1 16.03 -1.63 18.98** 37.39** -4.68 41.98** 
 [1.21] [0.15] [2.17] [1.98] [0.32] [2.42] 
Post12*Cashta1 36.08** -11.84* 41.60*** 34.50* -31.08*** 54.68*** 
 [2.57] [1.67] [2.79] [1.84] [2.81] [2.82] 
Post3*Cashta1 47.44*** -1.49 43.81** 48.94** -16.17 64.22*** 
 [2.82] [0.12] [2.57] [2.29] [1.18] [2.80] 
Cfw    4.5 -9.22* 20.53** 
    [0.43] [1.73] [2.28] 
Growth    -5.17 -6.79*** -0.53 
    [1.49] [3.20] [0.17] 
Exchrgr    7.72 -4.91 10.90*** 
    [1.51] [1.25] [2.95] 
Observations 5388 5377 5171 4184 4170 4022 
R-squared 0.74 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.76 
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 Table 6: Trade Credit and Bank Credit Growth 
 
The dependent variables are the trade credit measures. See header to Table 2 for variable 
definitions. The Creditgr is the annual growth of bank credit to the private sector scaled by GDP,  
for each country-year.  This table shows the interactions of Creditgr  with the Crisis, Post12 and 
Post3 dummies.  The models are estimated with firm-fixed effects (see model (3) in the paper) 
using an unbalanced sample. The standard errors were obtained using clustering on country and 
time as explained in the paper.  ***, ** and * represent coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level.  Absolute value of robust t-stats in brackets.   
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs Trectos Tpaytoc Ntcs 
Crisis -3.33 0.82 -4.1 -5.44 4.34 -8.96 
 [0.45] [0.15] [0.70] [0.62] [0.68] [1.24] 
Post12 -8.33** 0.55 -9.91*** -10.96** 0.57 -12.39*** 
 [2.34] [0.31] [2.66] [2.29] [0.22] [2.75] 
Post3 -18.86*** 0.31 -19.28*** -19.86*** 0.1 -19.44*** 
 [4.60] [0.07] [6.46] [4.77] [0.02] [5.77] 
Credgr -48.10* -10.15 -41.01* -66.37* -14.03 -55.54* 
 [1.81] [0.74] [1.79] [1.76] [0.57] [1.87] 
Crisis*Credgr 113.33** 63.58* 65.67 140.53** 38.19 116.54** 
 [2.06] [1.90] [1.35] [2.04] [0.91] [1.99] 
Post12*Credgr 67.79*** 20.19 52.05** 78.77** 26.67 58.11** 
 [2.63] [1.54] [2.38] [2.22] [1.13] [2.09] 
Post3*Credgr 16.67 6.44 8.5 39.43 8.15 31.52 
 [0.50] [0.26] [0.31] [0.93] [0.25] [0.92] 
Cfw    5.51 -6.87 18.61** 
    [0.60] [1.30] [2.33] 
Growth    -3.77 -5.62** 0.42 
    [1.09] [2.49] [0.15] 
Cashta    5.08 3.29 5.01 
    [0.55] [0.37] [0.37] 
Exchrgr    5.95 -7.79** 11.28** 
    [1.00] [2.27] [2.18] 
Observations 5529 5531 5302 4256 4244 4091 
R-squared 0.75 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.77 
 
 
